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Comment
Municipal Liability for Constitutional Violations:
Can You Fight City Hall?
A Survey of the Circuits
INTRODUCTION
When an individual's constitutional rights are violated by a state
or local official acting under color of state law, that person's primary
legal recourse is a federal suit' against the particular official in-
volved brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 and its jurisdictional coun-
terpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4).' Unfortunately, the section 1983 suit
does not always provide an adequate remedy. Individual wrong-
doers' are often difficult to identify, may be judgment-proof, and
may have a good faith defense under section 1983 that broadens in
scope as their duties and responsibilities expand. Additionally, a
wrongdoer may receive sympathy from a jury reluctant to find him
liable for just doing his job.' Because of these difficulties, the partic-
ular municipal corporation that employs the offending local official
often presents a more appealing target for liability.
While a suit against a municipality involves none of the above
difficulties, plaintiffs are confronted with an even more basic prob-
1. It will be presumed that a state action will not be as desirable as one brought in a more
"neutral" federal forum.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) reads in pertinent part: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (4)
To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing
for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
4. The usual situation giving rise to a § 1983 action is one where a state or local police
officer violates the plaintiff's constitutional rights by some act of physical violence. See, e.g.,
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). However, the application of § 1983 is far broader,
encompassing actions from employment termination to discriminatory zoning.
5. See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89
HARV. L. REV. 922, 923 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Damage Remedies].
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lem: in Monroe v. Pape' the United States Supreme Court held that
a municipality is not a "person" under section 1983 and, therefore,
is not subject to liability under it. The court in Monroe based its
holding on a review of the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871 which contained the language currently found in section
1983. Noting Congress' rejection of an earlier version of the proposed
Act that would have held municipalities liable in certain cases,7 the
Court concluded that Congress did not intend that municipalities
should be held liable for violations of constitutional rights.' Despite
heavy criticism that it misinterpreted the Act's legislative history,9
the Court has consistently upheld its reading.'" Monroe is now re-
garded as a complete bar to suing municipalities under section 1983.
Because municipalities are desirable defendants" and because
the possibility of municipal liability has been precluded under sec-
tion 1983, attorneys have been searching for other ways to sue them.
This comment will discuss the geneses and theories of liability of the
most frequently used methods of maintaining a cause of action
against a municipality under federal statutory and constitutional
authority:' 2 suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,11 1985,11 1986,11
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, city officials, acting under color of state law, entered
petitioners' home in the early morning, routed the family from bed, and made them stand
naked in the living room while the officials searched and ransacked the entire home. They
then took Mr. Monroe to the police station and held him on open charges for ten hours
without allowing him to contact his family or an attorney. They interrogated him and released
him without charge.
Petitioners brought suit under § 1983 against the city and individual officers. Recovery was
allowed against the officers, and the case is regarded as establishing § 1983 as an effective
means of remedying, in federal court, alleged constitutional wrongs by state officials.
7. The Court noted that during the debate of the bill, the Sherman amendment was
proposed. That amendment would have made the residents of a county, city, or parish liable
for full compensation to any victim of racial violence, including acts by private citizens. 365
U.S. at 188 n.38. The Court did not decide if Congress would have had the power to make
municipalities liable under these circumstances. Id. at 191.
8. Id.
9. The most common criticism is that because the proposed bill would have made munici-
palities strictly liable, rejection of the bill by Congress should be interpreted only as a rejec-
tion of this broad liability and not as a general rejection of any municipal liability. See Hundt,
Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 770
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hundt].
10. See, e.g., City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973).
11. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
12. To keep this .comment within manageable limits, certain aspects will not be exam-
ined. Those not covered include: a state claim brought in federal court under pendent juris-
diction; equitable relief; claims brought under the fourteenth amendment in combination
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1988,1s and directly under the fourteenth amendment. 7 Decisions
from the eleven judicial circuits will then be examined to determine
with some part of the Bill of Rights; and the effects of state common law immunity or eleventh
amendment immunity on municipal liability.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
14. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for civil rights violations of the type examined
by this comment are brought under subsection (3). It reads:
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; . . . in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do,
or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1970) reads:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done,
and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having
power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses
so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his
legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person
by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in
an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or
refusal may be joined as defendants in the action. ...
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) reads:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of'this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the
United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and
enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to
the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the consti-
tution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of
punishment on the party found guilty.
17. The key part of the fourteenth amendment for these actions is § 1. It reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
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current trends, and finally, a suggestion will be made as to which
theory, if any, is deserving of Supreme Court approval.
THE ALTERNATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION
Those Rejected by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has already rejected several causes of action
aimed at securing municipal liability for civil rights violations. As
explained above, Monroe precludes an action against a municipality
for damages under section 1983. In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, ,s the
Supreme Court relied on Monroe to deny an equitable suit against
a municipality brought under section 1983. It found no evidence in
the legislative history or language of section 1983 "that the generic
word 'person' . . was intended to have a bifurcated application to
municipal corporations depending on the nature of relief sought
against them."'"
In Moor v. County of Alameda,"0 the plaintiff looked to section
1988 as a basis for a cause of action. Section 1988 authorizes federal
courts to apply appropriate state law remedies where the federal
remedy available is inadequate for the protection of federal civil
rights. The plaintiff argued that since no suit was available against
a municipality under section 1983, that section was inadequate for
the protection of the rights it guaranteed. Therefore, he contended,
the Supreme Court should, under section 1988, apply the state law
which held municipalities vicariously liable for torts committed by
local officials.
The Moor court rejected this argument, saying that section 1988
was intended to allow the incorporation of only a state remedy into
federal law. The Court said Congress showed no intent that section
1988, standing alone, should allow federal courts to adopt a cause
of action granted under state law. Instead, the cause of action must
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
19. Id. at 513.
20. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
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arise originally from the federal civil rights statutes.2' In addition,
the Court stated that section 1988 is limited to situations where the
state law is not inconsistent with the Constitution or other laws of
the United States. Since vicarious municipal liability is inconsistent
with Monroe's interpretation of section 1983, the Court held there
was no cause of action under section 1988.22
The Fourteenth Amendment Cause of Action
The most frequently employed method of suing municipalities is
a direct suit brought under the fourteenth amendment, using 28
U.S.C. § 133111 to obtain jurisdiction. The genesis of this theory is
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics4 where the court allowed a federal cause of action for
damages resulting from a fourth amendment violation. Writing for
the majority, Justice Brennan said that there should be a federal
remedy for every violation of a federal right, 5 absent any "special
factors" that counsel hesitation."6 Giving this language an expansive
reading, lower federal courts justified a cause of action against indi-
vidual federal officers for the violation of any civil right, not just
those embodied in the fourth amendment. 2 Later the courts further
expanded the concept to include municipalities as appropriate de-
fendants for civil rights violations based on the fourteenth amend-
ment.
This second step of including municipalities as defendants poses
two potential problems. First, the Supreme Court's decision in
Monroe could be read as evidencing a finding of congressional intent
21. Id. at 702-06.
22. Id. at 706-08.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) reads in part: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000 ... "
24. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the plaintiff was arrested by federal agents acting
under color of federal law. Without either an arrest or search warrant, they entered his
apartment, manacled him in front of his family, searched his apartment and then removed
him to the federal courthouse where he was interrogated, booked, and strip searched.
25. Id. at 396.
26. What Justice Brennan considered to be "special factors" is not explained. In his
concurrence in Bivens, Justice Harlan described the limiting factors as "appropriateness,"
i.e., whether the suit is justified by policy considerations, and "necessity," i.e., the presence
of alternative remedies. Id. at 407. For a more detailed analysis of these limitations, see
Hundt, supra note 9, at 776-95.
27. For a listing of cases, see Hundt, supra note 9, at 771 n.10.
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that municipalities should not be held liable for any violation of any
federal civil right. Such a reading of Monroe would, of course, pre-
clude the possibility of an action being brought against a municipal-
ity under any theory. Although it is possible that the Supreme Court
will so decide the question of municipal liability, 2 lower courts have
apparently assumed Monroe to be limited to actions arising under
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 187129 or section 1983 alone.
The second problem is whether the language in Bivens justifies
the jump from individual to municipal defendants. There is no ex-
press language in Bivens that suggests municipalities were meant
to be included as defendants. The idea that there should be a federal
remedy for every violation of a federal right, the rationale behind
the expansion, is arguably satisfied by the ability to sue individual
defendants.
The rationale in support of the expansion of Bivens to include
municipal liability is that without it, there may, in some cases, be
no adequate or effective federal remedy, since individual defendants
enjoy favorable jury considerations and other legal advantages that
may free them from deserved liability, whereas municipalities do
not.10 Since the action against individual defendants is inadequate,
public policy requires that one be created against municipal defen-
dants to assure the existence of an adequate federal remedy.'
Courts receptive to this argument and willing to read Monroe2 nar-
rowly may be convinced that they are free to balance interests and
provide relief against municipalities when justified by the facts of a
given case.
The persuasiveness of this argument is greatly bolstered by City
28. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), seems to indicate that in the Court's
view, the legislative history of the Act of April 20, 1871, does not show a congressional intent
to preclude all civil rights actions against municipalities. In Moor, the Court dismissed a §
1988 action against a municipality, basing its decision in part on its interpretation of § 1988.
Since the petitioner also brought the action under § 1983, the Court partially relied on Monroe
and its reading of the legislative history. However, if the Court had read the legislative history
as calling for a complete bar of municipal liability, it could have decided on that point alone,
rather than interpreting and deciding on the basis of § 1988. See text accompanying notes 21
& 22 supra.
29. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 includes what are now §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. See
notes 38 & 39 infra.
30. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
31. For a discussion of the policy arguments for and against municipal liability, see
Hundt, supra note 9.
32. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
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of Kenosha v. Bruno" where the Supreme Court refused to rule on
the cause of action brought against a municipality, saying there was
a dispute, to be settled by the district court on remand, as to
whether the money requirement of section 1331 had been met. Al-
though the Court's action does not clearly indicate its acceptance
of the cause of action against a municipality under the fourteenth
amendment, Justices Brennan and Marshall, in a concurring opin-
ion, explicitly stated that if appellees could prove on remand that
the $10,000 minimum amount was present, "then § 1331 jurisdiction
is available, . . and they are clearly entitled to relief. '3
Armed with the language of the concurring opinion, the policy
arguments favoring municipal liability, and the interpretations of
Monroe and Bivens outlined above, petitioners have taken their
civil rights cases to court and pleaded that the fourteenth amend-
ment and section 1331 give the courts the ability to hold municipali-
ties liable.
The Section 1981 Cause of Action
Prior to 1973, most courts viewed what is now termed the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988, as one document and said that
Monroe precluded liability against municipalities brought under
any section of the Act, including section 1981.11 However, in District
of Columbia v. Carter 3 decided in early 1973, the Supreme Court
pointed out that not all sections of the Act have the same historical
origin7.3 Section 1983 originated from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
33. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
34. Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
35. See, e.g., Arunga v. Weldon, 469 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1972); Jones v. City of Houma,
339 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. La. 1972); Lyle v. Village of Golden Valley, 310 F. Supp. 852 (D. Minn.
1970); Fanburg v. City of Chattanooga, 330 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Tenn. 1968); Scolnick v.
Winston, 219 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
36. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
37. In Carter, the court of appeals declared that the District of Columbia was meant to
be included in the scope of § 1983. This decision was based on an earlier Supreme Court
decision that the district was a "State or Territory" for the purposes of § 1982. The court of
appeals reasoned that if this were true'for § 1982, it must also be true for § 1983.
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that § 1982 appeared originally as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 while § 1983 derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. It reasoned that
" '[dlifferent problems of statutory meaning are preseted by two enactments deriving from
different constitutional sources.' " Id. at 423.
The Court analyzed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and determined that it was enacted to
enforce the thirteenth amendment, to which the District of Columbia was subject. The Ku
1977-78
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which was aimed at implementing the fourteenth amendment,"
while section 1982 was enacted with section 1981, as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, enforcing the thirteenth amendment. 9 The
Court said that "'[d]ifferent problems of statutory meaning are
presented by two enactments deriving from different constitutional
sources.' "40
In addition, an examination of the word "person" as used in both
sections reveals that they do not encompass the same class. In sec-
tion 1981, "person" defines those protected from civil rights viola-
tions,4' while in section 1983, the word describes those subject to
liability for the violation of the guaranteed rights. In deciding in
Monroe that municipalities may not be held liable under section
1983, the Supreme Court based its decision on the perceived intent
of Congress that the definition of "person" should not be read to
include municipalities.2 Since the word as used in section 1981
represents a different class, it is obvious the Monroe definition does
not apply.
In light of these distinctions, courts have recently taken a second
look at the section 1981 action free from the restraints of the Monroe
holding. 3 When viewed this way, the scope of the section is very
broad. It prohibits all racial discrimination, regardless of the source,
and would seem to include municipalities as possible defendants.4
Klux Klan Act of 1871, however, was enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment, which
was intended to apply to the states or those acting under their authority. The District of
Columbia, therefore, was not intended to be included under that Act. Thus, the term "State
or Territory" under § 1 of that Act, now § 1983, was not meant to include the District.
38. Section 1983 was enacted with what is now § 1986 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871.
39. Section 1981 was enacted with what is now § 1982 as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Part of what is now § 1985 was enacted in 1866, and it was enacted in full in 1871. For
another interpretation of § 1981, see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1977)
(court expressed its opinion that § 1981 resulted from an attempt to implement both the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments).
40. 409 U.S. at 423.
41. See note 13 supra.
42. See note 7 supra.
43. See, e.g., Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977); Sethy v. Alameda County
Water District, 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976); Raffety v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp.
1045 (D. Md. 1976); Robinson v. Conlisk, 385 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
44. It has been argued that § 1983, which was enacted after § 1981, is an implied repeal
of § 1981's allowance of a cause of action against a municipality. This argument has been
rejected with little discussion. See Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1031 (3d Cir. 1977). In
addition to making this argument, Judge Garth, in a dissenting opinion, outlined a six-part
argument that § 1981 and the Act of 1866 cannot be read to establish a basis for municipal
liability. Id. at 1037-52 (dissenting opinion).
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There is, however, one major drawback to the section 1981 cause
of action. Since section 1981 grants all persons the same benefit of
the law as is enjoyed by "white citizens," it has been interpreted to
supply a cause of action only for racially motivated discrimination.45
The section apparently does not, for example, supply a cause of
action to a white citizen brutalized by a white policeman acting
with no racial motive. Therefore, section 1981 does not provide the
all-inclusive remedy provided by the fourteenth amendment.
The Section 1985 and Section 1986 Causes of Action
There is no current authority for the proposition that sections
1985 and 198648 support a cause of action against a municipality for
the infringement of civil rights. The arguments mustered to free
section 1981 from the Monroe bar are not applicable to these sec-
tions. 7 Therefore, the section 1983 definition of "person," applied
in Monroe to exclude municipalities, applies with equal force to
sections 1985 and 1986.
SURVEY OF THE CIRCUITS
The First Circuit
The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided in Kostka v.
Hogg48 that no cause of action is provided under the fourteenth
amendment against a municipality, apparently rejecting a Rhode
Island federal district court decision in which such an action was
allowed.49 In Kostka, the plaintiff sued a city and various officials
for damages 0 for the shooting death of Stephen Kostka. The plain-
tiff alleged a fourteenth amendment cause of action, asserting it was
supported by an expansive reading of Bivens. The court reviewed
45. The Supreme Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976),
made it clear that white citizens may sue under § 1981, but only for racially motivated
"reverse" discrimination. See 15 DuQ. L. Rxv. 495 (1977).
46. For the text of these sections, see notes 14 & 15 supra.
47. Section 1986 was adopted with § 1983 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Section
1985 was enacted partly by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and in total by the 1871 Act. See
notes 38 & 39 supra.
48. 560 F.2d 37 (lst Cir. 1977).
49. Panzarella v. Boyle, 406 F. Supp. 787 (D.R.I. 1975).
50. Suit was filed against the town of Westford, Massachusetts, the city's police chief,
policeman David Hogg, and several other officers.
1977-78
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Bivens and determined that although it technically allows a cause
of action, it also "teaches that a federal court should proceed with
caution" when requested to create a supplemental damage remedy
directly from the Constitution."'
In exercising this caution, the majority held that when the desired
remedy is in conflict with federal legislation or a constitutional pro-
vision, "it should not be judicially created if the existing remedies
adequately protect the constitutional guarantee in question."52 The
court first noted that the plaintiffs had a section 1983 action against
the individual wrongdoers, an action that according to Monroe may
not be brought against a municipality. In addition, the court noted
that the Supreme Court in Aldinger v. Howard53 and Moor v.
County of Alameda4 refused to hold that municipalities may be
liable on other theories. The court found that these decisions exhib-
ited a Supreme Court finding that Congress intended a complete
bar to municipal liability for conduct in violation of an individual's
constitutional rights.55
The court then briefly examined the adequacy of the section 1983
remedy and determined that although "superior opportunities for
compensation" may exist in a suit against a municipality, this did
not render the section 1983 remedy inadequate.56 As a final matter,
the court asked if the action against a municipality was
"indispensible to the effectuation of the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus beyond the power of Congress to preclude." Deciding with
"no difficulty" and little discussion that it was not, the court denied
the remedy. 7
Although the court said the holding was to be narrow, i.e., limited
to a fourteenth amendment action for money damages, it could have
broader ramifications. It may preclude a damage action against a
municipality under any portion of the Civil Rights Act, including
51. 560 F.2d at 42.
52. Id.
53. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). In Aldinger, the plaintiff asserted pendent jurisdiction existed as
to a state cause of action brought against a city. The Supreme Court rejected the assertion,
but stated that the decision was limited to "pendent party" jurisdiction over claims brought
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For the argument that Aldinger
does not apply to action brought under § 1981, see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1031-
32 (3d Cir. 1977).
54. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
55. 560 F.2d at 43-44.
56. Id. at 42.
57. Id. at 44.
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section 1981, because the court read Monroe, Moor, and Aldinger as
evidencing a Supreme Court determination that municipalities
should never be held liable for the violation of federal civil rights.5 1
The court realized that section 1981 was derived from a different
constitutional source than was section 1983, but found support for
its decision in "broader considerations of federalism," which it felt
were part of the Supreme Court's reasoning in the above three
cases.
59
The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet definitively
ruled on the availability of either the fourteenth amendment or
section 1981 cause of action. A section 1985 claim was refused in
Spampinato v. City of New York ° in 1962.
The key fourteenth amendment case in this circuit is Brault v.
Town of Milton6 where the court first allowed a cause of action, but
then reversed its decision after a rehearing en banc. The reversal,
however, did not constitute a holding that a suit is not cognizable
under the amendment as a general matter, but rather that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief under the facts presented.
Thus, the question of whether suit may be brought under the
amendment is still open,12 although the dissenters argued that the
majority decision effectively precluded any such suit. 3
Through its failure to decide the issue in Brault, the court of
appeals has opened the door for a relatively creative group of district
courts to find the existence of a cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment. These courts have ignored the Brault dissenters' pessi-
58. No § 1981 action has been brought in the circuit. A § 1985(3) action was rejected in
Curran v. City of Portland, 435 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Me. 1977) (city is not a person under
either § 1983 or § 1985(3)).
59. 560 F.2d at 44 n.6.
60. 311 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962).
61. 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975).
62. Judge Feinberg, in a short concurring opinion, noted that the majority did not decide
the question of the availability of a suit under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 741. See
also Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1976) (court noted that the en banc
decision in Brault did not decide the issue and the court again refused to decide it, relying
on other grounds for its decision).
63. Judge Smith, author of the original panel decision allowing the cause of action, joined
in a dissent by Judge Oakes commenting "[wihat the majority here describes as a failure to
state a claim is in reality an adjudication on the merits that the Constitution affords no
remedy. ... 527 F.2d at 741 (dissenting opinion).
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mistic view and regard the fourteenth amendment question as un-
answered. With the exception of a few cases,' 4 the district courts
have generally allowed the cause of action. The three most recent
cases, Citizens Council on Human Relations v. Buffalo Yacht
Club, 5 Adekalu v. New York City," and Skyers v. Port Authority7
have all held that municipalities may be sued under the fourteenth
amendment. In Buffalo Yacht Club and Adekalu, the courts did not
debate the issue, apparently assuming that the cause of action was
available. 8
As to the section 1981 action, at least one district court has held
that a cause of action can be stated under it. In Skyers, the plaintiff
also brought a section 1981 action for the alleged unconstitutional
termination of his employment with the defendant. The court re-
jected the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the "reference
to 'persons' contained in § 1981 describes those protected by the
statute, and not those proscribed from its violation, as in § 1983."l
The court also noted the different origins of sections 1981 and 1983
and the contrary results reached by other courts in deciding the
issue.70 It accepted the argument that "a municipality, however
protected from suit under § 1983, is subject nonetheless under §
1981."I'
The Third Circuit
In Mahone v. Waddle," decided in August of 1977, the issue of
municipal liability under both the fourteenth amendment and sec-
tion 1981 was brought before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Judge Rosenn, writing for the majority, held that a cause of action
64. See, e.g., Scolnick v. Winston, 219 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (city can be sued
under either the Civil Rights Act or the fourteenth amendment). See also Turano v. Board
of Educ., 411 F. Supp. 205, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (availability of the cause of action ques-
tioned).
65. 438 F. Supp. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
66. 431 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
67. 431 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
68. In Buffalo Yacht Club, the court simply said the city could be sued if the § 1331 money
requirement was satisfied. 438 F. Supp. at 325. In Adekalu, the court noted that the weight
of authority is in favor of such suits and that the question is still open in the circuit. 431 F.
Supp. at 818.
69. 431 F. Supp. at 83.
70. See notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
71. 431 F. Supp. at 83.
72. 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977).
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against the city of Pittsburgh had been stated under section 1981.
Monroe was distinguished, once again, on the theory that the use
of the word "person" in section 1981 referred to a different class of
persons than those described in section 1983. The court also relied
on the sections' different legislative origins as support for its conclu-
sions.73
Unlike most section 1981 cases, Mahone does not deal with dis-
crimination in employment or the making of contracts." Here, the
plaintiff's claim for damages allegedly resulting from police miscon-
duct was based on the last part of section 1981 which grants all
citizens the right to "full and equal benefit of all laws" and subjects
all citizens to punishment equal to that imposed on white persons.75
The court agreed with the plaintiff that section 1981 clearly ex-
tended beyond the right to contract and that the cause of action did
fall "within the ambit of the statutory language."76 It found support
for this reading in a "contemporary understanding" of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: the act was to "eradicate all discrimination
against blacks and to secure for them full freedom and equality in
civil rights."77
Having decided the section 1981 issue in favor of liability, the
court avoided the fourteenth amendment issue, relying on the prin-
ciple that a federal court should avoid constitutional issues where
possible. The fourteenth amendment issue, therefore, is still open
in the circuit,79 and this has caused a debate within the district
73. See notes 35-42 and accompanying text supra.
74. In Mahone, two black residents of Pittsburgh alleged they were stopped by the two
named defendants, police officers, and subjected to racially motivated verbal harassment and
physical abuse. The incident culminated in their arrest and conviction based on the defen-
dants' allegedly perjured testimony. 564 F.2d at 1020.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). For the text of the act, see note 13 supra.
76. 564 F.2d at 1028.
77. Id. For a similar decision, see Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa.
1974)(district court held a cause of action was stated against a municipality under § 1981).
78. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). The Third Circuit has also followed the
maxim that a federal court should decide nonconstitutional, pendent claims rather than
constitutional ones. Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977). In Mahone, the court
viewed Gagliardi as requiring this action, and this approach may evidence a trend developing
in the circuit to avoid the fourteenth amendment issue. Thus, it seems unlikely the court will
decide the issue in the near future.
79. Judge Garth, in his strongly worded and lengthy dissent in Mahone, argued that §
1981 does not provide a cause of action and that the fourteenth amendment question should
have been decided. He then concluded that no cause of action should be implied. 564 F.2d
at 1037 (dissenting opinion).
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courts that shows no sign of abating. 0
The district courts of the Third Circuit, especially the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, have been among
the most active in the country on the fourteenth amendment ques-
tion. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, at least three decisions
since 1974 have stated that a cause of action exists under the four-
teenth amendment," and since 1976 three decisions have held to the
contrary. 2 With so many recent cases having inconsistent results,
no definite trend is discernible. The courts seem to be waiting for
guidance from the court of appeals,83 guidance which appears un-
likely to come in the near future since the Third Circuit seems
reluctant to decide the issue. This situation leaves the issue of the
availability of a cause of action under the fourteenth amendment
in the circuit very confused.
As to other possible bases of action, the court of appeals has relied
on Monroe to preclude an action under section 1986,84 and two dis-
trict court cases have held there is no action under section 1985.85
The Fourth Circuit
In Cox v. Stanton,"8 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals opened
the door to the possibility of a suit under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court there reversed a district court dismissal based on
an improper reading of a statute of limitations and affirmed a dis-
80. The fight has not been affected either way by two court of appeals decisions which
assume or just leave open the question of municipal liability under the Constitution and §
1331. See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976); McCollough v. Redevel-
opment Authority, 522 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1975).
81. See Culp v. Devlin, 437 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia,
435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
82. See Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp.
389 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Pitrone v. Mercadante, 420 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
83. In Culp v. Devlin, 437 F. Supp. 20, 22 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the court allowed a cause of
action under the fourteenth amendment, but only because it soon expected a decision from
the court of appeals. With the trend developing in Gagliardi and Mahone, it appears unlikely
the appellate court will decide the issue in the near future. See note 78 supra. The district
courts may decide to follow the court of appeals in the future and refuse to deal with the
question, deciding instead on nonconstitutional grounds.
84. See Ocasio v. Bryan, 374 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1967).
85. See Flesch v. Eastern Pa. Psychiatric Inst., 434 F. Supp. 963 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Redding
v. Medica, 402 F. Supp. 1260 (W.D. Pa. 1975). In Redding, the court also decided there was
no cause of action under § 1981. This portion of its decision is now rendered suspect by the
Mahone decision. See notes 72-79 and accompanying text supra.
86. 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975).
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missal of the plaintiff's section 1983 action against a county. In
dictum, the court reminded the district court that the plaintiff also
sued under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments directly, and
that under Bivens and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in Brault v. Town of Milton, a municipality could be sued on
those bases. 7 This reminder has not, however, been interpreted as
definitively authorizing a suit.
In Raffety v. Prince George's County,8 the district court reviewed
Bivens, Brault, and the line of cases authorizing a cause of action
under the fourteenth amendment and found them either not con-
trolling or unpersuasive. It thus effectively rejected Cox as well. The
court was not convinced that the precedents in the area required it
to grant a cause of action against a municipality. It reasoned that
the "rights of the plaintiffs to vindication of the privileges secured
to them by the Federal Constitution would not be significantly en-
hanced by finding another base of action to be the Fourteenth
Amendment." 9
The Rafferty court did hold, however, that the plaintiffs had
stated a cause of action under section 1981, and thereby reversed a
trend in the Fourth Circuit's district courts against finding a cause
of action under any part of the Civil Rights Act. In Black Brothers
Combined of Richmond v. City of Richmond, 0 the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia had rejected a cause of action
brought under sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988 on the theory that
the Monroe definition of "person" precluded suit of a municipality
under any part of the Civil Rights Act. In Bennett v. Gravelle,9 a
court in the same district had refused to impose liability based on
section 1981 on the theory that by allowing a damage action under
that section, section 1983 is deprived "of its essential significance. 9 2
The Raffety court distinguished these cases on the ground that
the Supreme Court opinion in District of Columbia v. Carter3 dem-
87. Id. at 50. Additionally, the concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Winter in
Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 1974), provides some
support for a cause of action directly under the fourteenth amendment.
88. 423 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Md. 1976).
89. Id. at 1058.
90. 386 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Va. 1974).
91. 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
917 (1972).
92. Id. at 215.
93. 409 U.S. 418 (1973). For a complete discussion of how this decision affects a § 1981
action, see note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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onstrated that the word "person" as used in section 1981 is not to
be read to preclude municipal liability. Since Carter was decided
after Bennett, the Raffety court felt Bennett had little precedential
value. In addition, the court noted that although section 1981 had
been applied to cases not involving employment in only a few in-
stances,9 a finding that section 1981 is limited to employment or
contract actions would mean the "equal benefit" clause was
"meaningless phraseology."95
Thus, although the district courts in the Fourth Circuit are not
as unsettled as those in the Third Circuit, the established rules
there have been seriously questioned by Raffety. Although it is only
a district court case, Raffety has shown that the circuit's precedents
can be easily sidestepped. The Fourth Circuit appears, therefore, to
be beginning a period of renewed activity.
The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has twice gone to the brink of
deciding the fourteenth amendment issue and has both times re-
treated from the edge, leaving the question undecided. In United
Farmworkers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray
Beach,9" the court said that since the suit was also brought against
numerous individual municipal officers, any relief granted would
"surely be felt by the City." 7 It therefore did not decide whether the
city itself could be sued under the fourteenth amendment. Unfor-
tunately, throughout the remainder of the opinion the court referred
to the individual defendants by the collective term "the city," thus
giving the appearance it had decided in favor of municipal liability
when in fact it had not. In Traylor v. City of Amarillo,9" the court
of appeals stated in a footnote that if any violation of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights were found, then 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provided a
sufficient jurisdictional basis for an action against the city.9 The
94. In Raffety, the plaintiffs, a white husband and his black wife, alleged that various
officials of the local police and fire departments illegally and with racial motivation detained
and questioned them for many hours in connection with a house fire that killed the plaintiffs'
three children. 423 F. Supp. at 1048.
95. Id. at 1062.
96. 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
97. Id. at 802.
98. 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974) (court of appeals affirmed district court's decision in
favor of the defendant city on the merits, but discussed the viability of the plaintiff's claim).
99. Id. at 1157 n.2.
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court did not say, however, whether the fourteenth amendment
could be used to supply the cause of action to the plaintiff, again
leaving that question unanswered.
Therefore, when faced with the same issue in Schofield v. County
of Volusia,'"1o the District Court for the Middle District of Florida
encountered no controlling precedents from the court of appeals and
felt free to decide that a cause of action was not stated under the
fourteenth amendment. The Schofield decision is, however, limited
in scope, and it may in fact be read to support such a cause of
action. The court seems to assume the presence of a claim for relief,
but then applies the "necessary and appropriate" test of Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Bivens to defeat the plaintiff's claim. 0'
This unique approach adds an entirely new dimension to the area.
The court seems to indicate that a cause of action is cognizable, but
only where necessary and appropriate to vindicate the individual's
constitutional rights. The court held that since the plaintiff's rights
could be vindicated through an equitable suit available against the
county,' ° or through a section 1983 suit against the individual de-
fendants for damages, the fourteenth amendment cause of action
did not pass the test.'"3 This is a very strict application of Harlan's
test. Alternative suits such as those suggested by the Schofield court
are almost always available to a plaintiff, but they may not provide
adequate relief.0 The rigid application used in Schofield would bar
a fourteenth amendment cause of action in the great majority of fact
situations.
With regard to other bases for a cause of action, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has twice rejected a section 1985 claim,' 5 and in
1972, a district court refused a claim based on the entire Civil Rights
Act. 106 The subsequent holding in District of Columbia v. Carter,
however, may reopen the section 1981 issue.
100. 413 F. Supp. 908 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
101. Id. at 909. For a discussion of the test, see note 26 supra.
102. This was an employment case and the appropriate equitable relief would have been
reinstatement with back pay. See notes 124-26 and accompanying text infra.
103. 413 F. Supp. at 909.
104. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
105. See Davis v. Howard, 561 F.2d 565, 572 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977); Traylor v. City of
Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156, 1157 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974). In Traylor the court was discussing equita-
ble relief under § 1985. Its refusal to grant equitable relief indicates that a § 1985 action for
damages would probably also be denied.
106. Jones v. City of Houma, 339 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. La. 1972).
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The Sixth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has, without extended
discussion of its reasoning, twice granted a cause of action against
a municipal defendant under the fourteenth amendment. In Hanna
v. Drobnick,0 1 the court cited Bivens and City of Kenosha v. Bruno
and stated that "[w]e agree with appellants that the Bivens case
does create a cause of action." 08 In Amen v. City of Dearborn,'9 the
court relied on Hanna and City of Kenosha v. Bruno and said "it is
well settled that municipalities . . . may be sued directly for four-
teenth amendment violations .... "110
It is curious that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has had so
little difficulty deciding a question that has baffled other circuit and
district courts. The decisions in Hanna and Amen lack the in-depth
analysis accorded the issue in other circuits, raising doubts as to
whether the issue was properly briefed and argued before these
courts. But whatever the court's reasoning, it appears the fourteenth
amendment cause of action is well established in the circuit.
Other forms of action are not so firmly entrenched. Although the
court of appeals has not decided the issues, the district courts have
refused actions brought under sections 1985 and 1986,"' and the
Civil Rights Act in general." 2 The case which refused the cause of
action under the Act in general was decided in 1968, however, and
the holding in District of Columbia v. Carter may reopen the availa-
bility of the section 1981 claim.
The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have accepted
the fourteenth amendment cause of action. In Calvin v. Conlisk, "1
the court relied on City of Kenosha v. Bruno for authority that
municipalities could be sued directly under the amendment."' Al-
107. 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975).
108. Id. at 398.
109. 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976).
110. Id. at 559. A third decision, Bosely v. City of Euclid, 496 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1974),
arguably supports a finding of a cause of action, though the reasoning is unclear.
11. See Veres v. County of Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd mem.,
542 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1976).
112. See Fanburg v. City of Chattanooga, 330 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
113. 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 902 (1976).
114. Id. at 8.
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though the Calvin decision was vacated and remanded by the Su-
preme Court on the ground that other parts of the decision con-
flicted with Rizzo v. Goode,"' the fourteenth amendment ruling
apparently remains intact within the circuit. At the very least, it
evidences the court of appeals' opinion on the question.",
Even if Calvin's precedential effect is questionable, however, the
availability of the fourteenth amendment cause of action seems
settled. The court of appeals has twice taken up the issue since
Calvin, both times deciding in favor of municipal liability. In
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515117 and McDonald
v. Illinois,"' the court relied on Calvin to support its holding. Al-
though the availability of the action seems apparent, its scope has
been limited by the McDonald decision. There, the court indicated
that though a cause of action against a municipality may exist, it
is only available where the city has engaged in a policy of constitu-
tional deprivation, as contrasted with a single action by one or a few
of its officers. The court found that the facts before it failed to
evidence such a policy and concluded that "we consider the implica-
tion of a federal judicial remedy to the extent which would be neces-
sary to impose liability. . . here would be out of harmony with the
doctrine built up under § 1983 . . .,,"
The court was careful to apply the theory only to the facts of this
case, but the availability of the fourteenth amendment cause of
action in the circuit now depends on how strictly the court defines
the word "policy" in future factual situations.2 0 At the very least,
the application of this concept will preclude an action against a
municipality for an isolated act of violence or constitutional depri-
vation by one of its officers.
Regarding other causes of action, the court of appeals in 1972 held
that no claim existed under any part of the Civil Rights Act.' 2' But,
115. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
116. Calvin dealt primarily with the ability of individuals or groups to sue for court-
ordered enforcement of constitutional standards governing police activities. Since Rizzo
reached an inconsistent result, Calvin was vacated, presumably on this ground alone.
117. 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976).
118. 557 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (court said it would be irrational not to hold municipalities liable).
119. 557 F.2d at 605.
120. If the word "policy" is read to require proof of a series of related constitutional
violations, or a conspiracy of such actions, it is unlikely that fourteenth amendment causes
of action will frequently be found to exist.
121. See Flood v. Margis, 461 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1972).
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as in various other circuits, the decision came before District of
Columbia v. Carter. Subsequent to Carter, a district court, in
Robinson v. Conlisk,'22 made an in-depth review of the history,
wording, and purpose of sections 1983 and 1981 and concluded that
a section 1981 suit was available. Judge Marshall said in a memo-
randum opinion that section 1981 "prohibits all discrimination,
[even if] it be by . . .municipalities. . . . I cannot ignore the
legislative history and the broad language of § 1981. Section 1981
means what it says . ... "I2 The court concluded that a cause of
action had been stated under section 1981.
The Eighth Circuit
In Owen v. City of Independence,'24 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that a cause of action may be stated under the
fourteenth amendment. A close examination of the court's opinion,
however, reveals that the claim in Owen was for equitable relief.
The case, therefore, would not be strong precedent in a suit for
money damages. Owen involved the allegedly unconstitutional dis-
charge of a city police chief. The plaintiff sued for reinstatement,
an equitable remedy, and for back pay.'25 Although back pay is a
monetary award to be taken from the city treasury, the court ex-
pressed the opinion that the award is equitable in nature. The court
noted that this situation was not the same as one involving police
brutality in which an action for money damages would be appropri-
ate.' 26 Thus, while this decision accords with an earlier decision 2 1 in
its holding that a cause of action can be stated under the fourteenth
amendment, it leaves open the question of whether a suit for dam-
ages can be maintained. 28
122. 385 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. I1. 1974).
123. Id. at 535.
124. 560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977).
125. Id. at 931-32.
126. Id. at 933 n.9.
127. In Sheets v. Stanley Community School Dist. No. 2, 413 F. Supp. 350 (D.N.D. 1975),
the court said that a cause of action could be stated under the fourteenth amendment, but
that the plaintiff had failed to do so. The court did not address the question of whether back
pay awards are equitable or monetary. The case was affirmed without comment on this issue.
532 F.2d Ill (8th Cir. 1976).
128. In Bunch v. Barnett, 376 F. Supp. 23 (D.S.D. 1974), the court with little discussion
held that a cause of action had been stated under the fourteenth amendment. The plaintiffs
had alleged that while some flood victims had received totally rent-free housing, they had
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There are few cases in the Eighth Circuit concerning causes of
action under the Civil Rights Act. One district court held that there
was no action available under the Act in general." 9 Another denied
an action under sections 1981-1986.1" Both of these cases were de-
cided prior to District of Columbia v. Carter, however, and are
therefore of questionable validity insofar as their denial of a section
1981 cause of action is concerned.
The Ninth Circuit
In Arunga v. Weldon,'3' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected plaintiff's cause of action against a city brought under section
1981. Four years later, after the decision in District of Columbia v.
Carter, the Ninth Circuit took a second look at the section 1981
question. In Sethy v. Alameda County Water District,3 ' the court
reversed its prior holding that no distinction existed between sec-
tions 1983 and 1981 and distinguished Arunga, stating that there the
court was not presented with well-defined issues. 1 3
The court made a full comparison of the origins of sections 1981
and 1983, noting with particularity the differences in the sections
and concluding that a "proper reading of § 1981 today . . . implies
the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies, including
the remedy of damages against a municipal corporation in the case
of the kind presently before us."' 34
As to the rest of the Civil Rights Act, the only noteworthy case is
Dodd v. Spokane County. '3 This 1968 decision held the Monroe
"person" definition applicable to actions brought under sections
1985 and 1986.11
In the fourteenth amendment area, the leading case is the district
court decision in Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, '3 where the court refused
not. Due to the nature of these facts, and the court's limited discussion, it seems unlikely
this case will have substantial precedential value when the question arises in the future.
129. See Lyle v. Village of Golden Valley, 310 F. Supp. 852 (D. Minn. 1970).
130. See Daly v. Pederson, 278 F. Supp. 88 (D. Minn. 1967).
131. 469 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1972).
132. 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976).
133. Id. at 1159.
134. Id. at 1161.
135. 393 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1968).
136. The court also held that suit was precluded under §§ 1983 and 1988.
137. 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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to follow an earlier district court decision' 3 and held that the city
could be sued under the fourteenth amendment. Several other dis-
trict courts within the Ninth Circuit have followed Dahl,'39 as has
the court of appeals. In Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educa-
tion District, 4 0 the court of appeals held that the "person" require-
ment of section 1983 did not apply to a fourteenth amendment
claim. The court reached this conclusion without extended discus-
sion, and Dahl remains the most persuasive opinion on the question
in the circuit.'
The Tenth Circuit
Few cases have been brought before either the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals or the circuit's district courts concerning any of
these actions. In Weathers v. West Yuma County School District,'
the plaintiff raised the fourteenth amendment issue before the dis-
trict court, which refused to decide it.11 On appeal, the court of
appeals also refused to address the issue.'
The only case in which the issue has been directly addressed is
Farnsworth v. Orem City'5 where a district court held no cause of
action had been stated under the fourteenth amendment. The court
relied on Bivens and found "special factors counselling hesita-
138. In Payne v. Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the court examined the
possibility of § 1331 jurisdiction and dismissed the claim, holding that a finding of municipal
liability would "vitiate the Congressional mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 1358. Despite
this language, the court in Dahl, decided in the same district, had little difficulty in ignoring
Payne. The court mentioned the Payne language at the outset of its discussion but did not
consider it controlling. 372 F. Supp. at 649-50.
139. See, e.g., Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Sanfilippo v.
County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Kopetzke v. County of San Mateo,
396 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Cal. 1975). In Chavez-Salido, the court also found a cause of action
under § 1981. Despite its later reported date, the 1977 decision in Chavez-Salido was appar-
ently decided before the 1976 decision of Sethy, since the court struggled with Arunga and
expressed the hope of a quick decision by the court of appeals. For a discussion of Sethy and
Arunga, see text accompanying notes 131-34 supra.
140. 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975).
141. For a list of cases following Dahl, see note 139 supra.
142. 387 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo. 1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976).
143. The court said the remedies sought by the plaintiff were directly dependent on or
ancillary to §§ 1983 and 1985, and since no remedy existed against the defendant school
district under these provisions, any decision on the fourteenth amendment question would
be meaningless. 387 F. Supp. at 556.
144. 530 F.2d at 1342.
145. 421 F. Supp. 830 (D. Utah 1976).
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tion" ' 4 to require dismissal of the suit. The court said that these
factors "include considerations of federalism, the proper role of the
federal court in fashioning constitutional remedies in the absence of
congressional action, and the reluctance of the United States Su-
preme Court to extend liability to municipal corporations for pur-
ported civil rights violations by their officers."' 47 In adopting this
view of the limiting effect of "special factors," the court did not
decide the availability of the cause of action under the particular
facts, but rather decided there is no cause of action available against
municipalities under the fourteenth amendment. The court's appli-
cation of "special factors" was to the availability of the cause of
action in general, rather than assuming its availability and looking
for special factors in the facts of this case. Thus the court's result
seems to preclude a fourteenth amendment action, regardless of the
facts.
As to other causes of action, a section 1985 action was not permit-
ted in the district court decision in Salazar v. Dowd. 148
In a circuit with so few decisions, it is difficult to draw conclusions
concerning trends. Arguably, Weathers and Farnsworth demon-
strate the beginning of a trend against the fourteenth amendment
cause of action.
The District of Columbia Circuit
In Shifrin v. Wilson,' 49 the district court examined the fourteenth
amendment issue and in dictum said that municipalities may be
held liable under the amendment. 50 Since no other cases have ad-
dressed any of the issues, the District of Columbia is in essence
undecided as to all of the causes of action.'
A key question not addressed by the Shifrin court is whether the
District of Columbia may be held liable at all under the fourteenth
146. Id. at 831.
147. Id.
148. 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966).
149. 412 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1976).
150. The court in Shifrin first said that under the facts presented it did not have to decide
the issue of municipal liability under the fourteenth amendment. In dictum, the court de-
cided the issue anyway, finding there could be a cause of action. Id. at 1306.
151. The only other case concerning municipal liability was Payne v. District of Colum-
bia, 559 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1976), where an action was brought under the fifth amendment
rather than under the fourteenth.
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amendment. In District of Columbia v. Carter,'52 the Supreme
Court reiterated that the fourteenth amendment applies only to the
states, and that "actions of the Federal Government and its officers
are beyond the purview of the Amendment. And since the District
of Columbia is not a 'State' within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, . . . neither the District nor its officers are subject to
its restriction.' '51 3 This language seems to preclude any fourteenth
amendment liability as to the District of Columbia.
CONCLUSION
The issue of municipal liability for constitutional violations must
ultimately be decided on policy considerations that lie at the base
of the problem.'54 As the courts' differing analyses indicate, the
wording of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871, their legislative histories, and many of the cases which
provide the basis and justification for the causes of action are argua-
bly subject to interpretation both for and against municipal liabil-
ity. The acts do not discuss municipal liability, the legislative histo-
ries are inconclusive, and the language in cases such as Bivens is
vague. It is best to admit this at the start and to resolve the issue
in terms of which approach makes the most sense and results in the
most just law.
Presently, courts are faced with an "all or nothing" dilemma
when attempting to resolve the issue. On the one hand is the
"nothing" approach, where a municipality could never be held lia-
ble under federal law, not even if it conspired to deprive a person of
constitutionally guaranteed rights. On the other hand, under the
"all" approach, a municipality might be held liable for an isolated
action of an official performed with no intent to do harm. In judging
the validity of the opposing theories under the present law and
attempting to resolve which approach is best, it is advantageous to
examine each side of the dilemma.
152. 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
153. Id. at 424. For a discussion of Carter, see note 37 supra.
154. The conflicting policy considerations are, very generally, whether the federal govern-
ment is justified in imposing federal liability on local municipalities where there is both a
state cause of action as well as a federal cause of action against the individual wrongdoers,
and on the other hand, whether municipalities should escape federal liability where their
agents violate federal civil rights. For other policy considerations involved in the question,
see Hundt, supra note 9.
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The first question to be addressed is whether there is anything
unique about municipalities that justifies granting them total im-
munity from liability for the torts of their officers. Although there
are reasons for limiting the liability of municipalities, such as the
desire to minimize federal interference in the operations of local
government, these do not support the concept of total immunity. A
municipality occupies no special place in society that requires insu-
lation from liability for its wrongs. More importantly, the legislative
history of the Act of 1871, as interpreted in Monroe, does not sup-
port a reading of congressional intent to immunize municipalities
from federal liability under all federal civil rights law.' 5 In sum,
total immunity is nearly as unjust as strict liability for private torts,
as was proposed but rejected in the original Act of 1871.151
If it is accepted that municipalities do not "deserve" total im-
munity, a more difficult question then presents itself: Is there any-
thing in the federal law requiring that a municipality be found liable
for every tort of its officers? Is section 1981 or the fourteenth amend-
ment really a valid basis for the imposition of total liability, or the
"all" approach?
Most of the nation's federal courts certainly seem to think so. As
far as the section 1981 action is concerned, those courts that have
considered the question since District of Columbia v. Carter are
nearly unanimous in their support of the cause of action. Only the
First Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that it may not allow
a section 1981 claim against a municipality. 7 The courts of appeals
in the Third'58 and Ninth'59 Circuits have already adopted it as have
district courts in the Second,' 6 Fourth, 6' and Seventh"2 Circuits.
This shows a definite trend toward acceptance.
155. This is not to say that the Monroe court was wrong. Looking at § 1983 alone, the
Supreme Court's reading seems correct. Simply stated, Congress was faced with an amend-
ment which would have placed broad liability on municipalities. It rejected this proposal and
as a result used the word "person," apparently intending that the idea of municipal liability
should not be included in the Act. It is the extension of this conception of congressional intent
to other federal actions, such as those brought under the fourteenth amendment and § 1981,
that causes problems.
156. For a brief discussion of the Sherman amendment, see note 7 supra.
157. See notes 48-57 and accompanying text supra.
158. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
159. See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 122 & 123 and accompanying text supra.
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As the Third Circuit found, section 1981 is the easy way out. A
cause of action premised on it relieves the courts of the necessity of
deciding the more difficult constitutional question posed by the
fourteenth amendment. In addition, section 1981 is more suscepti-
ble than the fourteenth amendment to an interpretation that holds
municipalities liable. Whereas only a strained adaptation of Bren-
nan's opinion in Bivens will support a fourteenth amendment action
against municipalities, the wording of section 1981 clearly does so."'
Unfortunately, section 1981 provides only a partial remedy since in
the absence of racially motivated discrimination, the cause of action
provides no relief. Thus, even if section 1981 does require or justify
municipal liability, it does not completely supplant the fourteenth
amendment cause of action.
As to the fourteenth amendment cause of action, only the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals" 4 is definitely ,in support of it, but the
Fourth Circuit is leaning towards acceptance"' and district courts
in the Second, 6 Third, "7 Seventh, " and Ninth 9 Circuits have ei-
ther accepted the theory or have shown a trend toward doing so. In
contrast, only the First Circuit Court of Appeals 70 and district
courts in the Third,' Fifth,'72 and Tenth'7 3 Circuits have expressly
rejected it. 7 Of all the courts, circuit and district, that have decided
the issue, the trend is in favor of the fourteenth amendment action,
though perhaps "non-commital" more accurately describes the
dominant trend. This is especially so in the courts of appeals, since
almost all have had the issue before them, but only two have defi-
nitely decided it.
163. For a discussion of the theory behind the § 1981 cause of action, see notes 35-45 and
accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 107-10 and accompanying text supra.
165. See notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
167. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
168. See note 118 and accompanying text supra. See also Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp.
155 (N.D. II. 1975).
169. See notes 137 & 139 and accompanying text supra.
170. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
171. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
172. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 145-47 and accompanying text supra.
174. The Eighth Circuit and the District of Columbia have not really addressed the issue.
In the Third Circuit, district courts have both accepted and rejected a fourteenth amendment
cause of action.
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The reason for their hesitancy is obvious. Formulating a cause of
action under the fourteenth amendment, citing Bivens as authority,
is a strained argument. Clearly the words of Bivens do not in and
of themselves require such a result.'75 Justice Brennan only said
there should be a federal remedy for every violation of a federal
right; there is no indication that he meant to include municipalities
as potential defendants. 7 ' As noted earlier, the key to reading
Bivens to include municipalities as defendants is the argument that
section 1983 does not always provide an adequate remedy in a case
involving a civil rights violation by a municipal officer,'77 and that
if Brennan's mandate is to be fulfilled, there must be a cause of
action against the municipality itself, brought under the fourteenth
amendment. The flaw in this theory is that Brennan only said there
should be a remedy, he did not say there must be an adequate
remedy. Even if inadequate at times, section 1983 provides a rem-
edy and at least technically fulfills Brennan's mandate. To serve as
the basis for the fourteenth amendment action, the word
"adequate" must be read into Brennan's remark. 78
It should be. A remedy is the "means by which a right is enforced
or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compen-
sated."'79 When attempting to remedy a violation of constitutional
rights, the technical existence of one remedy, if inadequate, should
not preclude the resort to an adequate remedy. A suit against a
municipality, brought directly under the fourteenth amendment,
provides such an adequate remedy. s"
This "all" approach, however, has one major flaw that cannot be
overlooked. The theory is based on the assumption that a suit
against the individual wrongdoer will be inadequate. If this is not
true in a given case, the theory offers no justification for municipal
liability. The plaintiff would be able to remedy the violation of his
175. See notes 24-32 and accompanying text supra.
176. See Hundt, supra note 9, at 772-78.
177. As mentioned in the text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra, the reasons are that
individual wrongdoers are often difficult to identify, may be judgment-proof, have a good
faith defense under § 1983 that broadens in scope as their duties and responsibilities expand,
and may receive sympathy from a jury reluctant to find them liable for just doing their jobs.
See Damage Remedies, supra note 5, at 923.
178. For the view that a § 1983 damage remedy against an individual defendant is not
inadequate, see Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977).
179. Black's Law Dictionary 1457 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
180. For the reasons why the remedy against a municipality will be more adequate than
those against the individual wrongdoers, see Damage Remedies, supra note 5, at 923-24.
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rights without resort to municipal funds and Brennan's mandate
would be fulfilled through the adequate remedy available against
the individual wrongdoer. Thus, if the concept of adequacy, is to be
added to Brennan's words, as it should be, then provision must be
made for the situation where municipal liability is not required to
guarantee an adequate remedy. This can be accomplished by allow-
ing only limited municipal liability.'8 '
In Bivens, Brennan limited his imposition of liability to cases
where "no special factors counselling hesitation" exist."2 This limi-
tation has been generally ignored by courts basing their decisions
on Bivens. But whether or not this limitation is applied as a
"necessary and appropriate" test as done by Justice Harlan in
Bivens, '" it should hold a major place in the decision of these cases.
The use of "special factors" as a limitation allows for the develop-
ment of a common law to define under what circumstances munici-
palities may be held liable. Trial judges could determine whether
the factual situation of a case justified the imposition of municipal
liability, or if any special factor "counselled hesitation" thus war-
ranting the dismissal of the case against the municipality. The sub-
stance of the "special factors" test is something that would have to
develop as a body of case law, but as a general test the court would
determine whether the plaintiffs alternative remedies would be
"adequate."
This may sound perilously close to hinging the liability of one
party on the ability of the other party to pay a damage award.
However, the ability of the individual defendant to compensate the
victim is only one of the considerations used to determine the ade-
quacy of the remedy. The judge would also have to consider whether
as a matter of justice the factual situation called for imposing liabil-
ity on the municipality as a whole for the violation. For example, if
a local official performed an isolated act that violated a plaintiff's
rights, allowing a cause of action against the municipality would not
redress any wrong that the municipality could be said to have perpe-
trated. Thus, a cause of action against the municipality would not
be needed to adequately remedy the plaintiffs rights. On the other
181. For another proposal for limited municipal liability under the fourteenth amend-
ment, see Damage Remedies, supra note 5, at 952-60.
182. 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
183. Justice Harlan interpreted "special factors" to be a "necessary and appropriate"
test. Id. at 407. For a brief discussion of this test, see note 26 supra.
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hand, if the municipality knew or should have known the official
would commit the act, and either negligently or intentionally en-
couraged it, then the municipality should be held liable.' 4 This
approach looks for fault on the part of the municipality acting as a
unit, not just the fault of its individual agents. In cases where the
municipality can be said to be at fault, only a cause of action against
it under the fourteenth amendment will adequately remedy the in-
justice done to the plaintiff. Thus, municipalities would be poten-
tially liable for their wrongs, while at the same time, they would be
protected when the plaintiff's rights could be vindicated through
another suit.
The disadvantage of this approach is that until sufficient prece-
dents develop, there would be a state of turmoil that inevitably
surrounds the development of a new area of law. This is especially
true here, since the Supreme Court's guidelines would be necessarily
vague. The advantage of this approach is that courts will be able to
get away from the "all or nothing" bind that they now face. It is
nothing more than a device to better effectuate justice by granting
a cause of action with a self-limiting mechanism to be applied by
the trial judge where the circumstances justify it.
Whatever approach is taken, the Supreme Court must act on the
question. As shown by the above survey of the circuits, the courts
are badly divided. The majority of courts favor the existence of some
cause of action, but for differing reasons. Since the problem is one
that cuts across state, local, federal, and constitutional issues, it can
only be finally decided by the Supreme Court. It should be decided
soon.
CARL HARVISON
184. For a decision that comes close to applying this theory, see McDonald v. Illinois, 557
F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1975). McDonald held that municipalities could be held liable under the
fourteenth amendment, but only where they have been shown to have engaged in a "policy"
of constitutional deprivation. Its similarity to the approach suggested here depends on how
"policy" is defined in future cases. For the discussion of the case, see notes 118-20 and
accompanying text supra.
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